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SATELLITE UPRISINGS

## I. POSSIBLE APPROACHES

### A. Stalinist Approach.

1. Die-hard Stalinists are likely to blame the recent uprisings in Poland and Hungary (as well as the uprisings in Eastern Germany and the strikes in Czechoslovakia, 1953) on the fact that Stalin's successors have abandoned the policies and operating methods of the late dictator. Specifically, they are likely to focus their "Bolshevist criticism" on:

- a. The far-reaching concessions made to Tito;
- b. The purge of Beria and subsequent reduction of the powers of the secret police;
- c. The deviations from Stalin's doctrines, approved by the 20th CPSU Congress, notably the admission that several different "national roads to Communism" are possible;
- d. The personal degradation of Stalin, with its unsettling effects on Communists in the Soviet Union, in the Satellites and throughout the world.

2. Consequently, such die-hard Stalinists may be presumed to demand the re-establishment of rigid Moscow control over all Communist Parties, both inside and outside the Orbit, the re-inforcement of secret police power (including surveillance of Communist leaders outside Russia), the suppression of all deviations from Stalinist orthodoxy in propaganda and training, the purging of deviationist leaders such as Gomulka and a much stiffer attitude towards Tito.

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### B. Russian Nationalist (Chauvinist) Approach.

4. The violent anti-Russian feelings expressed by Poles, Hungarians and other Satellite nations, and the equally violent revulsion against Russian brutality in suppressing the Hungarian uprising, may well result in a new upsurge of violent and aggressive Russian nationalism and chauvinism. The expressions of this nationalism are entirely compatible with the Stalinist line suggested above, since Stalin, even though not a Russian, but a Georgian himself, has exploited such feelings repeatedly, especially during and after World War II.

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5. Russian (Communist) Nationalism may blame the current unrest in the Satellites on the survival of "petit bourgeois, narrow, reactionary" nationalism in those countries. It may point with pride to the fact that there have been no uprisings in the areas directly annexed to the USSR, such as Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Eastern Poland, Bessarabia, etc., and therefore demand that the present Satellites also be incorporated into an enlarged Federation of Soviet Republics. This would be in line with the original Comintern concept of a "World Federation of Soviet Republics" as the ultimate goal of Communist world revolution.

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7. Such nationalism would express itself also in cultural, intellectual and scientific matters. It would scornfully stress the dependence of the Satellite countries (and of international Communism, in general) upon the guidance, teachings and accomplishments of the superior Russian minds, reiterating well-known claims of Russian authorship for many inventions and discoveries.

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#### C. Leninist Approach:

9. Communist ideologists who have clung faithfully to the pure and unadulterated original doctrines of Lenin might criticize recent events in the Satellites by condemning both Stalin--who prepared the ground for these untoward events--and Khrushchev & Co. who proved unable to cope with them. Their Marxist-Leninist analysis would show that it was wrong to impose a Communist government by force of arms upon countries where the working class was not yet sufficiently mature to evolve such a regime on their own. Stalin thereby stifled the intrinsic revolutionary forces of the workers and peasants of the Satellite countries and denied them the autonomy which Lenin accorded to national minorities, a concept which Stalin followed only while Lenin was still alive.

10. Such

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10. Such Leninist criticism would condemn Khrushchev for dealing only with some surface effects of Stalin's perversion of Lenin's original doctrines, for paying mere lip service to Lenin and for making unwarranted political concessions to the Red Army leaders, thereby facilitating the development of a 'Thermidor'--or military dictatorship--phase of the Russian revolution. In this context, the Leninists would denounce the attitudes of Moscow towards the uprisings in Poland and in Hungary as dictated by military considerations, by the war plans of the Red Army chiefs who need Poland as an approach to Central Europe, Hungary as an approach to Yugoslavia.

11. Leninists would also draw uncomplimentary comparisons between the personalities of Lenin and of Khrushchev, of Rosa Luxemburg and of Walter Ulbricht (present Secretary General of the East German CP), that is, between the leaders in the days of the Russian Revolution and their present-day successors. Such comparisons would show that today's leaders are no longer revolutionaries, ideologists or idealists, but party bosses, managers and dictators whose power is based on armed forces, secret police and an all-powerful bureaucracy.

12. Leninists would demand the return to Lenin not just in words, but in deeds. Their demands are likely to include the liquidation of the new class structure that has grown up under Stalin, the abolition of the privileges of managers, senior bureaucrats, Red Army Generals, etc., and the assignment of the "jet set" (the children of the privileged upper classes of Soviet society) to productive work. Most important, they will require the re-establishment of freedom of discussion within the Party, the subordination of the Red Army and of the government bureaucracy to party control.

13. The relations between the CPSU and the other Communist Parties inside and outside the Orbit will have to be reorganized in a New International, not a copy of Comintern or Cominform, but a stronger and yet more flexible structure. The first steps in this general direction are the replacement of the present leaders who are compromised beyond redemption by having accepted Stalinism and a searching self-criticism of each national party as the basis for formulating new party programs and policies.

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D. National Communist Approach.

15. For Tito and the Yugoslav Communists, National Communism has served as the official political philosophy of party and government since 1948. Communists

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who still owe allegiance to Moscow have come to express similar thoughts only since the 20th CPSU Congress--proclaiming "several different national roads to Communism"--and Khrushchev's reconciliation with Tito have made it possible for them to do so without risking expulsion from the Party or worse reprisals. It remains to be seen what degree of national Communism will still be "permissible" within the Orbit in the future. In the recent past, however, Communists in Poland and in Hungary, as well as members and leaders of Communist Parties in the West, have voiced varying degrees of national Communism, at least with reference to certain policy issues.

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16. National Communism will obviously analyze developments in Poland and in Hungary from a viewpoint diametrically opposed to those outlined under A, B and C above. It will proclaim that the working classes of every country have an equal right to seek their own way to salvation. While respecting the historic achievement of the Russian Revolution, it will deny any claim of Soviet hegemony, pointing out that even Lenin would never have been able to seize the government without the impact of World War I, without the preceding February revolution, and so forth. Such criticism will also point out that the present CPSU leaders deserve no credit for the Revolution of 1917 in which they played only a very minor part, if any, and that they are obviously incapable of grasping the entirely different problems of other countries and other nations.

17. National Communism will also state that the cause of Communism outside the Soviet Union would be much farther advanced today, if Moscow had not repeatedly sacrificed the national Communist Parties to the imperial interests of Russia. In this context, numerous historic examples, from Stalin's pact with Chiang Kai Shek at the expense of the CP of China to Stalin's deal with Hitler at the expense of the CP of Germany, his withdrawal from the Spanish Civil War, his alliance with French Fascist, Laval, may be quoted.

18. Such criticism will denounce Moscow's military suppression of the Hungarian uprising as destroying all the good will generated since Stalin's death and notably since the 20th CPSU Congress, especially in the Asian-African areas where the Communists were about to be recognized as champions of colonial independence. It will condemn also on ideological grounds the advancement of the role of the Red Army which safeguarded its strategic interests in Hungary and thereby sacrificed the political cause of Communism.

19. Criticism along these lines will lead to demands that the future of World Communism can be safeguarded only in a community of equals, that each national Communist Party must be free to choose its own way and to elect its own leaders and that relations between Communist Parties of different countries must be regulated on the basis of recognizing each other's sovereign rights and each party's equal share in furthering the ultimate goal of "liberating the World." Searching self-criticism along these lines is essential and leaders who cannot live up to these requirements must go.

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